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ABSTRACT
The evidence presented in this paper indicates that changes
in government spending, transfers and taxes can have substantial
effects on aggregate demand. The estimates also indicate that the
promise of future social security benefits significantly reduces
private saving. Each of the basic implications of the so—called
"Ricardian equivalence theorem" is contradicted by the data. The
results are consistent with the more general view of the effects of
fiscal actions and fiscal expectations that is described in the
paper.
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Government deficits are not the only way in which fiscal policy
affects aggregate demand, Changes in the tax rates that provide
incentives or disincentives to different kinds of spending have
been and can continue to be at least as important. The present
paper nevertheless ignores these fiscal incentives in order to
focus on the direct demand effects of the "nondistortionary" aspects
of changes in government expenditure, transfers and taxes. More
specifically, the paper examines whether the power of such, policies
is reduced or eliminated by the way in which consumers react to
the policies themselves or to the resulting change in government
debt.
The early Keynesian analysis was based on the extremeassump-
tion that fiscal policies affect consumption only through thir
impact on current disposable income. This view implied powerful
and predictable effects of tax reductions, transfers and deficit—
financed government spending. Over the years, this view has been
modified in two important ways, First, the profession nowrog-
nizes that the extent of this fiscal stimulus is limited by the
*
HarvardUniversity and the National Bureau of Economic
Research. This paper is part of the NBER Program of Research on
Economic Fluctuations. I am very grateful to James Poterba for his
help with the calculations and to the NBER and National Science
Foundation for financial support. This paper was prepared for
the Tulane Conference on Government Debt, Fiscal Policy, andExpec-
tational Theory. The views expressed here are the author's
should not be attributed to the NBER or Harvard University.
(2Ol79)2
monetary feedbacks through higher interest rates, reduced real
money balances and changes in portfolio composition. Second, we
have learned from Friedman (1957), Modigliani (1954) and others
that it is important to distinguish between transitory and permanent
changes in income and therefore that consumers' response to a
change in taxes or transfers depends on how long that change is
expected to persist. Although there is disagreement about the
quantitative implications of these two points, the general qualita-
tive conclusions are now universally accepted.
More recently, several economists have revived a very old argu-
ment about the equivalence of debt and taxes that implies that
government deficits have no effect on aggregate demand.1 More
specifically, the "pre—Ricardian equivalence hypothesis asserts
that consumers respond in exactly the same way to a change in taxes
and a change in the government deficit. A tax cut that leads to a
change in the government deficit therefore has no effect on consumer
demand. This "ex ante crowding out" makes the more general crowding
out through interest rates, real balances and portfolio effects
irrelevant. A similar line of reasoning leads to the conclusions
that transfer payments financed by deficits have no effect on
1The revival of this idea is due toBailey (1971), Baro (1974),
Kochin (1974), il1er and Upton (1974), and Tanner (1979a,b).
2i think the label "pre-Ricardian"£s preferable to "Ricardian"
because Ricardo himself made a point of rejecting this equivalence
argument which .had been suqqested by others. As O'Driscoll (1977)
has pointed out, Ricardo (1951,, 4:187) wrote "Thisargument or
charging posterity with the intërest on Our debt, or of re1ieving
thernfrorn a portion of such interest, is often used by otherwise
well informed people, but I confess I see no weight in it."(My
emphasis.) I shall refer to it as a "hypothesis" or "Proposition"
rather than a "theorem" to avoid the implication that it isprovable and true.3
demand and that the promise of future social security retirement
benefits does not increase current consumption. Barro (1979)
summarizes these implications of fiscal impotence in the concluding
paragraph of a recent paper; "It seems fair to say that neither
economic theories nor empirical analyses provide convincing suppor-
ting evidence for the effectiveness of fiscal policy. The area
of fiscal policy exhibits a wide gap between, on the one hand, the
weight of theory and evidence, and, on the other hand, the general
opinion of professional economists and policymakers." (p. 21).
My reading of the evidence and analysis of the theoretical
issues leads to quite different conclusions..1 believe that the
pre—Ricardian view greatly exagggerates the publi&s perception of
and response to the future tax obligations implied by existing
government debt. The assertion of fiscal impotence is therefore
quite unwarranted. On the contrary, a more general theory implies
and the evidence indicates that consumers do not regard taxes and
transfers as equivalent to changes in debt and that they do regard
both government debt and future social security benefits as net
wealth. Specific estimates in support of these conclusions are
presented in the present paper.
Moreover, even if the pre—Ricardian equivalence proposition
were true, changes in government deficits that result from changes
in government spending could affect aggregate demand, Only ifany
change in the government deficit induced an equal concurrent change
in private saving would government expenditure have no effect on
demand. While an increase in the government debt would, according4
to the pre—Ricardian view, make households feel poorer and would
therefore decrease their consumption, there is no reason why the
entire change in wealth should be eliminated in a single year.
The explicit estimates presented below suggest that the magnitude
of this form of ex ante crowding out is relatively small.
While the pre-Ricardian view puts too much emphasis on the
future tax liabilities that are needed to service the existing
debt, both the pre-Ricardian view and the conventional Keynesian
analysis overlook a different link between current fiscal poli-
cies and future tax liabilities. A rise in government spending in
one year may cause the public to expect higher spending in future
years and therefore higher taxes to finance that spending.
larly, a rise in current taxes may cause individuals to revise
their expectations of future taxes in the same direction. Section
1 examines briefly the nature and significance of the process by
which households respond to these "fiscal signals" by revising their
expectations and adjusting their spending.
The way in which any fiscal action affects current consumer
spending therefore depends on the resulting change in expectations
about future government spending as well as on its effect on con—
current disposable income and anticipated debt-service obligations.
Moreover, the change in expectations and spending that results from
any given fiscal action will differ from one time to anbther ma
way that depends on the whole history of previous fiscal actions
and on the recent and past legislative debates. It is therefore
impossible to predict with accuracy how consumers' spending will
respond to the fiscal change in a particular year. This uncertainty5
and variability of response has important implicationsfor macro-
economic policy and for the econometric testing of thepre—
Ricardian proposition.
The lack of a stable and predictableresponse implies that
it is not appropriate to use changes in taxes andgovernment
spending for year—to—year demand management. Fiscal policiesare
suitable for a situation like the 1930's but not forsmoothing
the minor fluctuations during the 1960's and 1970's.
The variable response of consumption to fiscalsignals
implies that econometric analysis cannot estimate "the"consumption
function but only the average effects onconsumer spending of
changes in government spending, in taxes and in transfers.
Although such estimates do not provide enough information to
guide short-run macroeconomic policy, theyare in principle suffi-
cient to test the hypotheses of fiscalimpotence and the pre-
Ricardian equivalence proposition.Theestimates presented below
provide clear evidence against the pre—Ricardian view and in
favor of the effectiveness of fiscalpolicy.6
1. Fiscal Expectations and Consumer Spending
The effectiveness o fiscal policy depends crucially on the
way in which the consumer links a current fiscal change to his
future tax liabilities and how these anticipated liabilities
affect his current behavior. The pre—Ricardian hypothesis focuses
exclusively on the future taxes that will be required to service the
debt that results from current fiscal action. The !fiscalexpecta-
tions" approach that I will now describe emphasizes that a current
rise in government spending or taxes is likely to imply a higher
future level of spending and taxes quite apart from any debt
service obligations. These two views have quite different impli-
cations about the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
This section begins by commenting briefly on why the pre-
Ricardian hypothesis is likely to be less important than its pro-
ponents argue. I then discuss the nature and implications of the
fiscal expectations approach. The next section then states five
testable implications of the fiscal impotence and pre-Ricardian
views that will provide the basis for the empirical work of the
current paper.
The pre-Ricardian hypothesis is based on the fact that a
dollar of tax reduction creates an extra dollar of national debt
that must eventually be repaid pr serviced by interest payments
with the same present value. The tax "reduction" is thus really
only a tax "postponement," Since there is no change in the present
value of the tax liabilities, there should be no change in consumer7
spending. While this argument has been known for a long-time, it
has baen rejected on the ground that much or all of the future tax
liability could be avoided by the current generation of consumers
by refinancing the principal and interest with additional debt
issues. Although the debt might eventually be repaid or serviced
by tax-financed interest payments, this tax burden can be shifted
to future generations.1
The ingenious feature of the revived pre—Ricardian argument
is the proposition that individuals will act as if they will live
forever because they are linked to future generations through a
chain of bequests. If a current taxpayer plans to leave a bequest
to his children, a decrease in his own tax and corresponding
increase in the tax on his children (with the same present value)
will cause him to increase his bequest. Indeed, to return to the
initial equilibrium, the tapayer must save the entire initial tax
reduction. The substitution of debt for taxes therefore has no
effect on current demand since the government's dissaving is just
offset by the individual's increased saving. A similar argument
applies even if repayment of the debt will be postponed for many
generations. Even if the current taxpayer does not care about the
1There are several other objections to the asserted equival-
ence of debt and taxes; see Buiter and Tobin (1978) and Barro (1979),
I regard the liquidity effect of the tax cut and the difference
between the government borrowing rate and private borrowing rates
as the two most significant of these additional objections, I
will not discuss any of these issues in the present paper in order
to focus on the contrasting views of expected future taxes,8
well-being of his great grandchildren, he will act as if he does
if each successive generation will plan to make a positive bequest
to the next generation. The current taxpayer will save the entire
tax reduction in order to keep the consumption level of all of his
future heirs unchanged.
The degree of foresight and rationality required by this
process clearly strains the credibility of the analysis. There are
two additional and more fundamental reasons for rejecting the con-
clusion that intergenerational altruism implies fiscal neutrality.
First, it is wrong to assume that parents who are concerned about
the utility of their children will necessarily wish to leave
bequests. A parent who believes that, because of generally rising
productivity and real incomes, his children will be richer than
himself, may well decide that the optimal "bequest" is negative,
i.e., a transfer from his children to himself. Since this deci-
sion cannot be enforced, the constrained optimum for the parent
is no bequest. This may remain the parent!s chosen position after
a tax reduction and a corresponding increase in the national debt,
It is clear that, for the vast majority of the population, there
are no significant bequests to children Moreover, many o the
observed bequests are unintended in the sense that the individuals
had expected to consume more of their wealth and leave a smaller
estate, Without the "interior solution" of positive intended
bequests for the current generation and for all future generations,
the "infinite life" character of current decision making is lost9
and the pre-Ricardian proposition is false.
Second, even if taxpayers respond to a tax reduction byan
offsetting transfer to the next generation, the form of the
transfer is very important. Barro and othersrecognize that their
theory appears to be contradicted by the relative unimportance of
bequests and note that there nevertheless are intergenerational
transfers because parents make voluntary contributions to children
in the form of educational investments and otherexpenses in the
home. However, unlike saving for additionalbequests, such in-kind
transfers involve addition, spending. Thus even aperfectly offset-
ting intergenerational transfer is consistent with the conclusion
that a tax reduction can increase currentconsumer spending.
When we drop the extreme assumption that individualsrespond
to fiscal changes as if they expect to live forever, it isclear
that a one—time tax cut represents an increase in lifetimewealth.
A one—time tax cut taken in itself would therefore beexpected to
cause a small increase in consumption in the currentyear and in
future years as well.1 A tax cut that is known to bepermanent
would of course imply a much larger increase in lifetimewealth and
would therefore £nduce a much larger immediate increasein consump-
tion.
More generally, households cannot classify taxchanges as
unambiguously temporary or permanent. Tax liabilities in future
1Binding liquidity constraints forany of the individuals
whose taxes are reduced would increase themagnitude of the short—
run response.10
years must be regarded as unknown and current spending decisions
must be made in the context of uncertainty about future taxes and
pretax incomes, An important aspect of a tax change in any year
and the associated legislative debate is that it causes households
to revise their expectations about future tax liabilities.
The response of household consumption to any tax change can
be formally regarded as a two-step process, First, each household
revises its subjective probability distribution of all its future tax
liabilities. Second, it sets the level of current consumption to
maximize expected utility (over its whole lifetime, including the
utility value of bequests) using the revised subjective probability
distribution of future taxes and incomes.1 The response to a
particular tax change in a year is therefore not a fixed constant
"propensity to consume1' but an amount that varies with current
conditions, previous fiscal policies, the legislative debate, etc.
The more that a given change in taxes is taken as a signal that
future taxes will change in the same direction, the greater will
be the consumers' initial response. The evidence presented in
1Note in particular that the entiresubjective distribution
matters and not just the vector of mean values. This has impor-
tant implications for the Flaven -Hall-Sargentanalysis of
consumer behavior. In general, the specific past history of
income and taxes will be relevant for updating the subjective
distribution. When this is true, the change in consumption from
one year to the next will depend not only on the current income
and tax variables but also on the path of previous observations.
This may explain why the evidence of Bilson and subsequent
currently unpublished work by Hall and Misbkin does not support their
original expectations.11.
section 3 suggests that the average response to tax changes has
been smaller than traditional Keynesian theory suggests but sub-
stantial enough to refute the pre-Ricardian claim of fiscal impo-
tence.
The effect of an increase in current government spending also
depends on the resulting increase in expected future tax liabili-
ties.1 The traditional Keynesiananalysis ignores the !Isignal!
aspect of a spending increase and therefore assumes that a change
in government spending implies no change in anticipated future
taxes. Consumer spending is therefore not altered.2 The pre—
Ricardian approach focuses exclusively on the increased debt that
results from the government spending and therefore on the need
for higher future taxes to repay the debt. Neither of these is
a realistic description of how an increase in government spending
changes the public's anticipation of future taxes.
To the extent that consumers expect an increase in government
am abstracting from the role of government spending as a
substitute for or compliment to private spending. Depending on the
particular type of public spending, it can substitute for current
private consumption and stimulate saving (e.g., public tennis
courts) or it can substitute for future private consumption and
therefore reduce saving (e.g., public nursing homes). Compliments
to current or future private consumption would have the opposite
effect.
2There is of course thepossibility of changes in consumer
spending that result from changes in interest rates, real balances
or portfolio composition. AsI noted in the £ntroduction, such
"second run& effects are ignoredthroughout thispaper in order
to focus on ex ante crowding out.12
spending to persist and to be financed by future taxes, they will
associate a higher level of future taxes with a current increase
in government spending. The tendency of government programs to
continue indefinitely and the presumption against permanent budget
deficits together imply that a current rise in government spending,
even though it is not accompanied by a concurrent rise in taxes,
will entail an equal permanent rise in taxes. This in itself
implies a quite substantial fall in the taxpayers' real "wealth"
and therefore a fall in current consumption. This reduction in
the public's wealth is offset to the extent that the future govern-
ment spending provides services of value. The effect on consump-
tion of an increase in government spending depends on the resulting
change in net wealth and on the specific role of government
spending as a substitute or compliment to current and future con-
sumption.
All of this implies that the response of consumers to current
changes in government spending cannot be determined a priori on
the basis of the effects of government deficits alone. Previous
studies1 that assumed that increases in government spending and
decreases in taxes would have the same effect on consumer spending
therefore introduced an artificial constraj..nt Although econQmetric
evidence cannot provide a precise measure of the effects of differ-
ent types of spending changesthe evidence prescribed in section
3 indicates that government spending has on average had relatively
little effect on
1For example, Kochin (1974) and Tanner (1979).13
private consumption. Changes in government spending therefore
appear to raise or reduce aggregate demand nearly dollar for
dollar.
In concluding this discussion of "fiscal expectations," it
is useful to emphasize the complexity of the changes inexpecta-
tions that can result from each fiscal action. In formal terms,
individuals respond to a fiscal signal by changing their subjective
probability distributions for all future taxes and expenditures.
It is not possible to represent these distributions by single-
valued "expected tax" and "expected government spending" variables.
Similarly, the conventional process of classifying tax changes as
"temporary" or "permanent" is much too simple and arbitrary a
representation of the complex change in expectations.14
2. Five Testable Implications of Fiscal Impotence
The pre-.Ricardian equivalence hypothesis has four implications
that can be tested directly with aggregate data on household con-
sumption. The more extreme fiscal impotence proposition that even
government spending does not add to aggregate demand entails a
further testable implication within this framework. The present
section discusses these five implications and describes the tests
that will be reported in section 3.
Each of the five implications refers to the effect of some
fiscal variable on consumer spending. The specific framework of
the analysis is a consumption expenditure function relating real per
capita consumer expenditures to a measure of real permanent income, to





where C. is consumer expenditure in year t is
1Another obvious candidate for inclusions in the equation
would be the real net rate of interest. Although it is clearly
very difficult to construct a useful seri,es for this variable,
Boskin's (1978) work indicates that progress on this is possible,
My only excuse for not trying to include such a variable in the
current study is the lackof an adequate series for the full
sample period,national income,1 W is the market value of privately owned wealthat
the beginning of year t,2SSW. is a measure of the value of future
social security benefits (that will be discussed later in this
section), Gt is government spending on goods and services (including
federal, state and local governments),Tt is tax revenues, TRt is
government transfers to individuals, and Dt is the net debt of the
federal, state and local governments. All variables are measured
in constant 1972 dollars and are stated on aper capita basis.
The specification of equation 1 avoids the Keynesian restric-
tion that consumer expenditure depends on disposable income and
allows instead the more general possibility that the propensities
to consume out of pretax income and out of tax reductions will
not in general be equal. The discussion in the previous section
of this paper made it clear that different consumption propensi-
ties are possible regardless of whether one accepts the
more elaborate specification might divide national income
into labor income and capital income or into personal income (net
of transfers) and retained corporate profits. The division between
labor and capital income poses problems for farm income, unincor-
porated businesses, etc, Previous studies suggest that the effec-
tive propensity to consume retained earnings may be quite close to
the propensity to consume other types of income (see, e.g,
Feldstein, 1973). The single national income variable is not only the
simplest specification but also, since it is closest in spirit
to the pre-Ricardian view that the households cash receipts are
not directly relevant to consumption, is the most suitable
framework for testing the other implications of the pre-Ricardian
hypothesis. The significance of retained earnings is tested directly
in section 3.
2
This wealth series is a slight improvement over the one that
I have used in previous papers. For the period from 1953 through
1977, it is the beginning-of—year household net worth variable
developed for the MIT-Penn-SSRC Model.(This variable, denoted
VCN, was provided by Franco Modigliani.) For earlier years, the
series is extrapolated backwards using the household wealth series
that I used in previous studies and that is presented in Evans
(1969). The new wealth series is presented in the Appendix to the
current paper.16
pre—Ricardian view that debt and taxes are equivalent or the more
general fiscal expectations view.
I should note at this point that although I think that equa-
tion 1 is a useful and desirable specification, I do not believe
that it is a complete or accurate model of consumer behavior. It
is important therefore to emphasize that I have adopted it as the
framework for the tests presented in this paper because it is a
direct generalization of the equations used by Barro, Kochin and
Tanner to support their claims that the data favor the pre-
Ricardian hypothesis. More specifically, they relate consumer
expenditure to the net government deficit rather than to the three
fiscal variables, thus implicitly imposing the constraint that
= = Theyalso use ordinary least squares estimation,
thus implicitly assuming that the fiscal variables are exogenous.
When these assumptions are dropped, the estimated parameters
strongly contradict the pre—Ricardian hypothesis. Although the new
estimates do not prove that the hypothesis is wrong, they do imply
that the earlier estimates should be given no weight. The esti-
mates to be presented in this paper leave no basis for asserting
that the evidence favors the pre—Ricardian hypothesis of fiscal
neutrality. As a minimum, the burden of proof now rests on those
who support that view.17
It is useful to begin with the strong form of the fiscal impo-
tence view that even government spending does not increaseaggre-
gate demand. This implies that an increase in government spending
by one dollar with all other variables constant must induce a one
dollar reduction in consumer spending. In terms of equation 1,
this implies that =- 1,Although this is necessary for complete
ex ante crowding out, it is not an implication of the pre-Ricardian
equivalence hypothesis. The pre-Ricardian view suggests that
is negative but presumably quite small since it reflects the first
year response of households to a one dollar decrease in the wealth
of a taxpayer whose economic life is effectively infinite. This
small negative effect may be either reinforced or counterbalanced
by the specific aspects of the expenditure itself.1 Although the
more general fiscal expectations approach is consistent with a
wider range of responses, it cannot be distinguished from thepre—
Ricardian approach on the basis of The key question about
is therefore whether or not is is equal to minus 1.
A key prediction of the pre-Ricardian hypothesis is that a
change in taxes has no effect when the levels of government spending
and transfers are held constant. According to this view, since an
increase in taxes also lowers the size of the public debt, consumer
spending remains unchanged; in terms of equation 1, =0.This
stands in sharp contrast to the more general fiscal expectations
view that a tax increase depresses consumption to an extent that
1See footnote 1,page 12.18
varies with the impact of the particular tax change on expected
future taxes. This implies that, although is not a constant,
the estimated value of will be negative.
The pre-Ricardian line of reasoning also suggests that an
increase in transfer payments financed by a government deficit
should have no effect on current consumption. The current transfer
payment is analogous to a reduction in taxes. While households
currently have more spendable income, they also have a new future
tax liability. The pre-Ricardian equivalence view implies that
these two effects should just balance to leave current consumption
unchanged:1 6 =o• Moregenerally, however, there are several
reasons for expecting transfers to be a powerful fiscal stimulus.
First, temporary transfers (e.g., unemployment insurance) and
some permanent transfers (e.g., welfare payments and disability
payments) are frequently given to individuals with binding liquidity
constraints. Second, an increase in veterans benefits, social
security or other permanent transfers is likely to be regarded by
the recipients as a permanent increase in income. Third, an
increase in the level of transfer payments will induce some indi-
viduals who are not currently eligible for benefits but who
1Although it m9ht be argued that transfer recipients are likely
to have a highermarginal propensity to consume cash receipts than
taxpayersin general, such an ar9ument would be quite contrary to
thecharacter of the analysis supporting the pre-Ricardian equivalence
hypothesis which implies that current consumption should not depend
on current cash f1w and that a redistribution of tax obligations
among families should have no effect.19
anticipate receiving benefits in the future to regard themselves
as richer and therefore to increase their current consumption;
this applies to all types of social insurance benefits that have
replaced private saving "for a rainy day." All of this suggests
that 6 is positive and may be quite substantial.
I have argued elsewhere that the anticipation of social secu-
rity retirement benefits causes individuals to reduce their own
saving for retirement and therefore, ceteris paribus, to increase
their consumption (Feldstein, 1974), To measure this effect, I
have used a variable that I have called "social security wealth"
and that I have constructed as the actuarial present value of the
social security benefits for which the existing workforce and
their dependents would become eligible when they reach age 65.1
These previous studies with a more conventional specification of
the consumption function imply that is positive and of the same
order of magnitude as the coefficient of the conventional wealth
variable (2).2 In contrast to this view, Barro (1974, 1978) has
1See Feldstein (1974) for a description of the construction of
this variable. Although a more refined calculation has since been
developed for use with microeconomic data (see Feldstein and
Pellechio, 1979), the original method is still used to calculate
the aggregate social security wealth values through 1974. Values
for 1975-77 were obtained by extrapolating the 1974 ratio of SSW
to GNP; although I plan to update the SSW series with the proper
calculations,. that calculation could not be completed in time for
this study. Limiting the analysis to the years ending in 1974
leaves the results of the study essentially unchanged. The SSW
series is presented in the appendix to this paper.
2For the most recent of these time seriesstudies, see
Feldstein (l979a). Microeconometric evidence in support of this
conclusion is reviewed in Feldstein (1979b).20
argued forcefully that the promise of future social security bene-
fits should not decrease saving and increase current consumption
because the taxes that will finance the social security benefits
represent a household liability that, over the infinite future, is
exactly as large as the benefits themselves. Since social security
involves an explicit intergenerational transfer, the coefficient
of SSW. provides a clear test of the pre-Ricardian equivalence
hypothesis. If =0,current households save to compensate
future generations completely for their extra tax burdens' while
>0implies that increases in future social security benefits
raise current consumption.
The final test is provided by including the value of the
government debt itself. The pre—Ricardian equivalence view empha-
sizes that the public debt does not represent net wealth at all
while the alternative "finite life" view is that the anticipation
of future debt service obligations only partially offsets the
value of the debt. Since the overall wealth variable (Wt) includes
the value of the public debt, the pre-Ricardian hypothesis implies
that a separate debt variable should have a coefficient that is
negative but equal in magnitude to the coefficient of the total
wealth variable; i.e., -.2'The alternative view is that
households treat public debt as a net contribution to wealth so
10r households are so irrational that they ignore future social
security benefits when deciding their current saving.21
that even if < 0 it is also true that + > 0.1
The focus on whether households regard the public debt as net
wealth suggests another possible test. Inflation reduces the
real value of public debt. If households regard public debt as
net wealth, the product of the inflation rate(lit) and the real
value of the debt at the beginning of the year(Dt) represents an
accrued real loss. Conversely, if households do not regard the
debt as net wealth, the fall in the real value of the debt has no
effect. Unfortunately, adding the variabletDt does not provide
a clear—cut test for two quite different reasons. First, what
matters is not merely the current rate of inflation but the expected
future rate of inflation. Moreover, for Treasury bills and other
debt with very short maturity, future changes in interest rates
may compensate but for long-maturity debt future inflation will
entail further losses. Second, and more important, variations in
the anticipated rate of inflation affect real net wealth in several
ther ways because of the existing tax laws. In general, a
higher rate of inflation raises the effective tax rate on the
income of nonfinancial corporate capital, on all types of interest
income, and, because of the progressive structure of the individual
income tax, on personal income as a whole. At the sametime,
higher rates of inflation induce capital gains on assets like
housing, land and gold. The coefficient of the'rrD variable would
reflect all of these missing variables that are correlated with
1An equivalentprocedure defines W to exclude the value of
government debt and tests whether the oefficient of a separate
government debt variable is statistically different from the coef-
ficient of W..22
and would therefore not provide a useful test of the debt neutrality
hypothesis •1
In summary, therefore, the pre-Ricardian equivalence hypothesis
implies that = == 2+37
=0.In contrast, the more
general fiscal expectations view implies that f3 >0, <0,
0 and -
37
>0.The impotence of government spending
implies further that 34 =- 1.The next section presents the esti-
mated parameter values.
1These comments dosuggest important ways in which anticipated
inflation may affect consumption and saving. These deserve further
analysis if we are to understand the full impact of inflation on
the economy.23
3. The Parameter Estimates
The most serious problem in the estimation of equation 1 is
the endogeneity of the key tax variable. Anexogenous increase
in consumer spending tends to boost aggregate demand ina way that
raises nearly all types of tax collections, particularly sales
taxes and profits taxes but also progressive personal taxes. This
introduces a positive correlation between taxes and consumerspen-
ding that biases the coefficient of the tax variable toward zero
and therefore in favor of the fiscal impotence and pre—Ricardian
hypotheses. This bias is reinforced to the extent that discre-
tionary changes in taxes have been used to offset fluctuations in
consumer demand,1 Because of the bias introduced in this way,
previous estimates2 have provided spurious support for thepre-
Ricardian hypothesis and for the view that fiscal policy is impotent.
Although the bias cannot be fully eliminated, it can be reduced
by instrumental variable estimation. The coefficient of the tax
variable (5) obtained in this way is substantially larger than
the more seriously biased ordinary least squares estimate. Other
estimated specifications described below also indicate the impor-
tance of the bias in the previous estimates of the effect of
1The importance of thepositive correlation between taxes and
consumer expenditure is indicated by a regression of realper
capita tax receipts on real per capita national income and real
per capita consumption. The coefficient of the consumption variable
is 0.70 (with.. a standard error of 0.09) while the coefficient of
the income variable is only 0.06 (whth astandard error of 0.06).
The estimate refers to the same sample period as the otherequa-
tions reported in this section.
2lncluding Buiter and Tobin(1978), Kochin (1974) and Tanner
(1979)24
taxchanges)
Before turning to the instruinental variable estimates, t is
useful to look briefly at the ordinary least squares estimates
presented in equation 1.1 of Table 1,,Note first that the coef-
ficient of the tax variable is small and less than its standard
error, a result that is consistent with the pre—Ricardian equival-
ence hypothesis. The estimated coefficient of the debt variable
is negative and the "2+isnot significantly different
from zero; this lends further support to the pre—Ricardian view.
However, the very large and clearly significant coefficient on
government transfers is in sharp conflict withthe assumption of
fiscal neutrality. Similarly, the coefficient of the social
security wealth variable does not support the pre-Ricardian hypo-
thesis. The results of the OLS estimation are therefore mixed and
give no clear—cut answer about debt equivalence in general although
they suggest that current transfers and the promise of future
transfers does raise consumer.. spending. Finally this evidence
strongly contradicts the view that variations in government spen-
ding induce equal offsetting changes in private consumption; the
point estimate indicates that only 11 percent of the variation in
government spending is offset by changes in personal consumption.
11t can of course be argued that several other variables in
the equation are also endogenous. Although this might in principle
be dealt with by enlarging the instrument set, there
are too few instruments to yield useful estimates, Equations with
additional variables treated as endogenous had unstable parameter
estimates with large standard errors. For example, when income is
treated as endogenous the coefficient of the tax variable is —0.317
but its standard error is 0.512; other coefficients and their












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The same specification is repeated in equation 1.2 but with the
tax variable treated as endogenous. An ideal instrumental variable
would be highly correlated with the systematic component of the
tax variable but uncorrelated with the concurrent disturbance in
the consumption equation. The Lnstrument that I have used is the
lagged value oe the tax variable itself; this achieves the desired
high correlation with the systematic component of the tax variable
but, because cyclical conditions last more than one year, is not
completely uncorrelated with the consumption disturbance in the
subsequent year. This use of instrumental variables may therefore
reduce but not fully eliminate the bias caused by the endogeneity
of the tax receipts.1
The instrumental variable estimates suggest that the pre-
Ricardian hypothesis fails each of the four tests described in
the previous section. The coefficient of the tax variable is now
a very sizeable —.464. The standard error of 0.359 reflects the
difficulty of achieving a precise estimate with the instrumental
variable estimator. The comparison of the coefficient and its
standard error indicates that the null hypothesis that 0 can
be rejected at approximately the 10 percent level. The coefficient
1Other instrumental variables might achieve a greater reduction
in bias but they are also likely to increase the mean square error
of the estimate because they are less strongly correlated with the
systematic components of the tax variable. However, adding the
variable G—lto the instrument set left the coefficients essen-
tially unchanged.27
of the debt variable is now positive and lends no support to the
hypothesis that =
_32.1The coefficient of the transfers variable
remains approximately equal to one =1.361with a standard
error of 0.189) implying averypowerful fiscal effect of changes
in the level of transfers. Finally, the coefficient of the social
security wealth variable is now larger and approximately equal to
the coefficient of ordinary fungible wealth. Thus all four tests
favor the more general fiscal expectation approach over the fiscal
neutrality conclusion of the pre-Ricardian hypothesis. The coeffi-
cient of the government spending variable indicates no ex ante
crowding out of government spending.
Since the government debt variable is completely insignificant
and has the wrong sign, it is omitted in equation 1.3.2 The coef-
ficients of the remaining variables do not change substantially
but the reduced collinearity lowers the estimated standard errors.
Note in particular that the coefficient of the tax variable (-.337)
is now twice its standard error. The coefficient of the social
security wealth variable (.024) is almost identical to the coeffi-
cient of the ordinary wealth variable and is also twice its stan-
dard error.3 These coefficients imply that each of the implications
1This can be seen also by the alternative procedure of defining
wealth to exclude the government debt. The coefficient of this net
private wealth variable is 0.025 (with a standard error of 0.009)
while the coefficient of the government debt variable is actually
larger, 0.035 with a standard error of 0.30. A similar result was
also obtained in the simpler specification of Yawitz and Meyer
(1976)
2Recall that government debt is part of real wealth and
therefore remains in the equation in that form.
3The coefficient of the SSW variable is approximately the same
as the coefficient that I obtained in earlier studies with a some-
what different equation specification.28
of the pre—Ricardian view can be rejected at conventional levels
of significance; it is obviously very much more significant that
all four tests should point simultaneously to rejection of the
debt equivalence view.
In an earlier study of the effect of social security wealth
(Feldstein, 1974), I found that adding the unemployment rate as
an additional variable to adjust for cyclical fluctuations in
permanent income had the effect of reducing the coefficient of
the SSW variable to less than its standard error.Ithough the
unemployment variable was itself statistically insignificant, this
finding caused some commentors to doubt the conclusion that the
promise of social security benefits reduces saving. In subsequent
research with the improved data that became available after the
national income accounts were revised, I found that adding the
unemployment variable no longer mattered and that the unemployment
variable itself remained statistically insignificant (Feldstein,
1979a). To test whether this remains true with the current speci-
fication and sample period, equation 1.4 has been estimated with
the product of the unemployment rate and the level of national
income) It is clear that the coefficient of the unemployment
variable is less than jts standard error and that the other coef-
ficients remain essentially unchanged2
1This specification, which was adopted in earlier studies
(Barro, 19787 Feldsten, 1978), allows the impact of changes in
the unemployment rate to vary with per capita income,
2i have also examined the effect of including this unemploy-
ment variable in combination with the debt variable. Neither of
them is then significant.29
Equation 1.5 shows that the accruing losseson real government
debt donot have a significant effect onconcurrent consumer
spending and that the presence of this variable doesnot alter the
coefficients of the other variables.Equation 1.6 combines all
three of the variables that have been includedseparately but found
to be insignificant. All three coefficientsremain less than their
standard errors, Although thegreater collinearity raises the
standard errors of the other coefficients,their estimated values
remain essentially unchanged.
Equation 1.7 examines whether there is thesame propensity to
consume corporate retained earnings (RE) as otherforms of national
income. The coefficient of the REvariable is negative, suggesting
that a higher level of retainedearnings raises aggregate savings.
However, since the coefficient is only aslarge as its standard
error, the hypothesis that consumption is not affectedby the
distribution of corporate profits betweendividends and retained
earnings cannot be rejected.1
Since the government spending variablehas been insignificant
in each of the specifications, I havereestimated the equation
with this variable omitted. Theremaining coefficients, presented
as equation 1.8, show little change from theearlier specifications.
The only change worth noting is thatthe standard error of the tax
'This resultsupports an earlier finding reported in Feldstejn
(1973).30
coefficient is now even smaller, implying a t—statistic of 2.6,
At an earlier stage in this study, I estimated equations con—
tainng lagged values of the fiscal variables. These equations,
estimated by ordinary least squares, provide further evidence of
the bias that results from the dependence of the tax variable on
concurrent exogenous disturbances in consumer spending, Equation
1.9 presents one such specification in which the lagged tax variable
and current tax variable are both included. Although both coeff i-
cients are significant, the coefficient of the lagged variable is
much larger and more nearly statistically significant. Dropping
the current tax variable leaves the other coefficients essentially
unchanged but raises the coefficient on the lagged tax variable
to -0.148 with a standard error of only 0.062. Although a lagged
tax variable would be expected to understate the true effect of a
tax change, it does indicate that there is a statistically signifi-
cant relationship that is masked when only the concurrent variable
is used.
In a further attempt to explore the importance of the simultan-
eity bias, I disaggregated the tax variable into five separate
components: federal personal taxes, federal nonpersonal taxes, state
and local sales taxes, property taxes, and other state and local
taxes. Unfortunately the collinearity among these variables is too
great to distinguish separate coefficients; the problem is exacer-
bated by instrumental variable estimation, However it is worth
noting that, in an OLS equation with current and lagged fiscal31
variables, the coefficients of three out of the five concurrent
tax variables are positive while four of the five lagged variable
coefficients are negative and more statistically significant.32
4. Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper indicates that changes in
government spending can have substantial effects on aggregate
demand. Although monetary feedbacks may limit the net effect on
output of any fiscal stimulus, there is no indication of ex ante
crowding out through consumers' reactions to government debt.
Indeed, each of the basic implications of the pre-Ricardian
equivalence hypothesis is contradicted by the data.
As I noted earlier in the paper, the analysis here has used
the same basic specification as Barro, Kochin and Tanner but has
dropped some of the restrictions that they had imposed. Rejecting
their conclusion in this extension of their own framework implies
that their parameter estimates can no longer be used to argue that
the data support the pre-Ricardian hypothesis.
The results are instead consistent with a more general view of
the effects of fiscal actions and fiscal expectations that is
developed in the paper. A key feature of this view is that consu-
mers interpret current changes in tax rates or in government spen-
ding as signals of possible future changes. More formally, they
respond to any fiscal change by altering their subjective proba-
bility distributions of the taxes that they will pay and the bene-
fits that they will receive for the rest of their lives. The
distinction between "temporary" and "permanent" tax changes is an
extreme and oversimplified version of this more general "fiscal
expectations" view. The response to a fiscal change therefore
cannot in general be calculated by classifying it as temporary or33
permanent and applying a corresponding propensity to spend.
My emphasis here has been on the impact of discretionary
fiscal changes. There are of course some economists who will wish
to ask a different, hypothetical question: "If the government
eliminated discretionary fiscal policy and adopted a set of fiscal
rules that dealt with all contingencies and lasted forever, would
there then be complete ex ante crowding out?" While I frankly do
not find that question very interesting, two things about the
answer are clear. First, except for unanticipated fluctuations
in the economy that trigger changes in the fiscal variables, the
individual knows his lifetime tax payments, transfer receipts and
benefits of government spending. If there are no liquidity con-
straints, the individual's consumption will depend only on the
present value of all fiscal actions and not on the particular
changes in fiscal variables as they occur. Second, the actual
uncertainty about future economic fluctuations implies that the
future values of the fiscal variables are also uncertain. The
individual will react to a change in his expectations about aggre-
gate economic fluctuations on the basis of both the direct effect
of these fluctuations on his income and also the indirect effect
through changes in his tax rate and other fiscal variables,. His
response to any change in his expectation about the economy will
therefore depend on the full set of fiscal rules. For example,
if a rise in unemployment causes a substantial reduction in tax
rates, the individual will respond to an expected increase in
unemployment by raising his current spending above what it would34
be with a different fiscal rule. In this sense, fiscal rules
affect aggregate demand. The parameter estimates based on the
very different regime of discretionary fiscal policy in which we
actually live do not provide a complete basis for testing how
the economy would behave under a regime of strict fiscal rules.
It is clear however that none of the estimated parameters are
inconsistent with the effectiveness of fiscal rules. In particular,
the significant coefficient of social security wealth and the simi-
larity of the effects of government debt and other wealth both
support the potential effectiveness of fiscal policy.
The fact that fiscal policies are potentially powerful does not
mean that they are useful tools for short-term demand management.
The important and complex role of fiscal expectations that I have
emphasized in this paper implies that the estimated coefficients
indicate only the average responses for the 42 year sample period.
The reaction to any particular fiscal change may differ substan-
tially from these averages, depending on the fiscal expectations
created by the circumstances of the change. The overall economic
response to any fiscal policy is further comp1icated by its mone-
tary and portfolio consequences.
We therefore do not have, and may never be able to have,
enough precise information to be confident that discretionary
fiscal policies can reduce the average amplitude of the short-run
business cycle. This implies that the appropriate role of fiscal
policy is much more modest than the task that it has been assigned
in recent years. The extent of our ignorance and the potentially35
powerful effects of fiscal changes imply that the magnitude of
discretionary fiscal changes should be very limited. More substan-
tial changes in fiscal policies should in general be limited to
situations in which a sustained change in aggregate demand is
sought and precise timing is unimportant.36
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